

Elections Canada is the non-partisan agency responsible for the conduct of federal elections and referendums

REPRESENTATION in the House of Commons of Canada



Elections Canada is the non-partisan agency responsible for the conduct of federal elections and referendums.

For additional information about representation in the House of Commons or about other aspects of the federal electoral system, contact:

ELECTIONS CANADA
257 Slater Street
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0M6

Telephone 1 800 463-6868
toll-free in Canada and the United States
001 800 514-6868 toll-free in Mexico
(613) 993-2975 from anywhere in the world
For people who are deaf or hard of hearing:
TTY 1 800 361-8935
toll-free in Canada and the United States

Fax (613) 954-8584
1 888 524-1444

Web site www.elections.ca

National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication Data

Main entry under title:
Representation in the House of Commons of Canada

Text in English and French on inverted pages.

Title on added t. p.: La représentation à la Chambre des communes du Canada.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-662-66278-4

Cat. No. SE3-62/2002

1. Representative government and representation—Canada.
2. Redistribution (election law)—Canada.
3. Canada. Parliament. House of Commons—Election districts.
 - I. Elections Canada.
 - II. Title: La représentation à la Chambre des communes du Canada.

JL167.R46 2002

328.71'0734

C2002-9800002-1E



TABLE of Contents

PREFACE	3
REPRESENTATION	4
HISTORY OF THE FORMULA	5
Confederation to 1915	5
1915 – The senatorial clause	6
1946 – Changing the formula	6
1951 – The 15 percent clause	6
1974 – The “amalgam” formula	7
THE PRESENT FORMULA	8
READJUSTING THE BOUNDARIES	10
HISTORICAL NOTE	10
THE COMMISSIONS TAKE OVER	11
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION	12
CRITERIA – WHERE TO DRAW THE LINES?	13
THE PROCESS OF READJUSTMENT	14
CONCLUSION	19
APPENDICES	20
FURTHER READING	21

PREFACE

“The right to vote and the right to be a candidate for election to the House of Commons are necessary but not sufficient conditions to ensure that the electoral law promotes both the equality of the vote and effective representation. How we assign Commons seats to provinces and territories and draw the constituency boundaries within provinces can also affect the degree to which we realize these three objectives” (*Reforming Electoral Democracy*, Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, 1991, Vol. 1, p. 123).

Several principles underlie Canada’s system of parliamentary representation. The first of these is territorial representation, meaning that each elector is represented in the House of Commons on the basis of a geographical division, called the electoral district or constituency or riding. On a country-wide basis and within each constituency, the democratic goal of the electoral system is embodied in the principle of “one elector – one vote,” which is set out in the *Canada Elections Act*. The application of this principle was clarified in a 1991 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, which held that the true meaning of the right to vote is not absolute equality of voting power but a right of effective representation. It is on these principles that electoral districts are drawn.

This publication has been prepared to shed some light on two fundamental but little-known aspects of the federal electoral system, namely:

the principle of representation in the House of Commons, in other words, how the seats in the House of Commons are divided among the ten provinces and three territories;

and, secondly,

how the electoral district boundaries are determined and periodically readjusted to reflect changing representation in the House of Commons and population movements from one region to another, as well as within each region.

This is not a comprehensive account of these topics, but rather an overview, which, it is hoped, will serve to stimulate further interest in, and study of, Canada’s electoral system.



The simple act of marking a ballot determines who will represent us in the House of Commons.

REPRESENTATION

One of the crucial questions faced by the Fathers of Confederation in 1867 was how to ensure equal representation in the House of Commons of Canada, while at the same time guaranteeing that each region of the country had a fair say in the daily workings of the new federation. They adopted as a basic working principle the idea of “representation by population,” by virtue of which each province was allotted a number of seats that directly corresponded to its proportion of the total population in relation to Quebec’s. Around this principle they designed a formula for distributing the number of seats in the House of Commons among the provinces.

From the start, however, they recognized the geographic, cultural, political and demographic diversity of the new provinces, as well as population size and rural and urban characteristics. As more provinces entered Confederation and as some regions grew and developed more than others, the diversity became more pronounced and a certain degree of compromise had to be built into the formula. As a result, the basic principle of representation by population was adopted by Canada.

REPRESENTATION SINCE 1867

NUMBER OF SEATS

YEAR	CANADA	ONT.	QUE.	N.S.	N.B.	MAN.	B.C.	P.E.I.	N.W.T.	Y.T. N.W.T.	Nfld.
1867	181	82	65	19	15						
1871	185	82	65	19	15	4					
1872	200	88	65	21	16	4	6				
1873	206	88	65	21	16	4	6	6			
1882	211	92	65	21	16	5	6	6			
1887	215	92	65	21	16	5	6	6	4		
1892	213	92	65	20	14	7	6	5	4		
1903	214	86	65	18	13	10	7	4	10	1	
									SASK.	ALTA.	
1907	221	86	65	18	13	10	7	4	10	7	1
1914	234	82	65	16	11	15	13	3	16	12	1
1915	235	82	65	16	11	15	13	4	16	12	1
1924	245	82	65	14	11	17	14	4	21	16	1
1933	245	82	65	12	10	17	16	4	21	17	1
1947	255	83	73	13	10	16	18	4	20	17	1
1949	262	83	73	13	10	16	18	4	20	17	1
1952	265	85	75	12	10	14	22	4	17	17	2
1966	264	88	74	11	10	13	23	4	13	19	2
1976	282	95	75	11	10	14	28	4	14	21	3
1987	295	99	75	11	10	14	32	4	14	26	3
1996	301	103	75	11	10	14	34	4	14	26	3

Many observers have commented that the history of Canada itself is one of compromises. Certainly, the question of provincial representation in the House of Commons is a case in point. Yet in spite of this, it is fair to say that even today the principle of representation by population remains at the root of the electoral system in Canada, as in many other countries.

The following pages briefly describe the evolution of the representation formula. This description is followed by an explanation of the present formula, how it is applied to determine the number of seats in the House of Commons, and how these are then divided among the provinces and territories.

HISTORY OF THE FORMULA

Confederation to 1915

At Confederation in 1867, *The British North America Act, 1867* (B.N.A. Act – renamed in 1982 the *Constitution Act, 1867*) established a parliament composed of two houses. The upper house, or Senate, was to consist of 72 non-elected members, or 24 representing each of the three regions – Quebec, Ontario and the Maritimes. The lower house, or House of Commons, elected by the people, was to comprise 181 members

representing the four founding provinces – 82 for Ontario, 65 for Quebec, 19 for Nova Scotia and 15 for New Brunswick.

In order that each province's representation in the House of Commons continued to reflect its population, section 51 of the *Constitution Act, 1867* stated that the number of seats allocated to each province would be recalculated after each 10-year (decennial) census, starting with the 1871 census. The total number of seats was to be calculated by dividing the population of each province by a fixed number, referred to as the "electoral quota" or "quotient." This quota was to be obtained by dividing the population of the province of Quebec by 65, the number of seats guaranteed for Quebec by the Constitution in the House of Commons.

This simple formula was to be applied with only one exception, "the one-twentieth rule," under which no province could lose seats in a redistribution unless its share of the national population had decreased by at least five percent (one twentieth) between the last two censuses.

1915 – The senatorial clause


In 1915, the first change was made to the original representation formula, by the adoption of the "senatorial clause." Still in effect today, this clause states that a province cannot have fewer seats in the House of Commons than it does in the Senate. In 1915, it had the immediate effect of guaranteeing four seats to the province of Prince Edward Island, instead of the three it would otherwise have had. It has had four seats ever since.

1946 – Changing the formula

Changing political circumstances and relationships, however, led to the development of a new set of rules, adopted in 1946 when the *Constitution Act, 1867* was amended. These new rules divided 255 seats among the provinces and territories based on their share of Canada's total population, rather than on the average population per electoral district in Quebec.

1951 – The 15 percent clause

Since the population of all provinces had not increased at the same rate, certain provinces lost seats. Because Nova Scotia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan were all to lose seats after the 1951 census, the "15 percent clause" was adopted to prevent a too rapid loss of seats in some provinces. Under these rules, no province could lose more than



The history of representation is one of seeking a fair voice for all parts of Canada in the House of Commons.

15 percent of the number of Commons seats to which it had been entitled at the last readjustment. The same three provinces, plus Quebec, however, all lost seats after the 1961 census. These same four provinces, plus Newfoundland, would also have lost seats after the 1971 census, so legislation was finally introduced to resolve this particular situation in 1974.

1974 – The “amalgam” formula

In 1974, concern over the continuing loss of seats by some provinces prompted Parliament to adopt the *Representation Act, 1974*, which, among other things, guaranteed that no province could lose seats.

In February 1974, the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections established that:

The objective must be adequate and realistic representation of all Canadians bearing in mind the historic undertakings arising out of Confederation and its responsibilities. The allocation of seats (in the House of Commons) is at the very heart of the Confederation compromise.

A “compromise” was therefore proposed to deal with representation in the House of Commons. The new formula, the third in our history, was more complicated than earlier ones. As in the pre-1946 rules, Quebec was used as the basis for calculations, but there were three differences. First, Quebec would henceforth be entitled to 75 seats instead of 65. Second, the number of seats assigned to Quebec was

to grow by four at each subsequent readjustment in such a manner as to slow down the growth in the average population of an electoral district. Third, three categories of provinces were created: large provinces, those having a population of more than 2.5 million, intermediate provinces, namely, those with populations between 1.5 million and 2.5 million, and small provinces, with populations under 1.5 million. Only the large provinces were to be allocated seats in strict proportion to Quebec; separate and more favourable rules were to apply to the small and intermediate provinces.

The amalgam formula has been applied once, leading to the establishment of 282 seats in 1976.

THE PRESENT FORMULA

Following the 1981 census, calculations revealed that the amalgam formula would result in a substantial increase in the number of seats in the House of Commons both immediately and after subsequent censuses (369 seats were projected after 2001). Effectively putting a hold on the process already underway to reassign seats, Parliament passed the *Representation Act, 1985*. It came into effect in March 1986.

The adoption of the *Representation Act, 1985* greatly simplified the formula described in the amended section 51 of the *Constitution Act, 1867* for calculating representation.

$$282 \text{ SEATS} - 1 \text{ Y.T.} - 1 \text{ N.W.T.} - 1 \text{ PUNABUT} = 279$$

$$\text{Population of provinces} \div 279 = \text{Electoral quotient}$$

$$\text{Provincial population} \div \text{Electoral quotient} = \text{Provincial seat allocation}$$

Application of the “senatorial clause”
and “grandfather clause”

The present formula for calculating representation in the House of Commons.

The current formula for representation is applied by carrying out the following four steps:

1 – Allocation to the territories

Starting with the 282 seats that the House of Commons of Canada had in 1985, one seat is allocated to the Northwest Territories, one to the Yukon Territory and one to Nunavut, leaving 279 seats. This number is used to calculate the electoral quotient.

2 – Calculation of the electoral district average

The total population of the ten provinces is divided by 279 to obtain the “electoral quota” or “quotient”, which is used to determine the number of seats for each province.

3 – Distribution of seats to each province

The theoretical number of seats to be allocated to each province in the House of Commons is calculated by dividing the total population of each province by the quotient obtained in step 2. If the result leaves a remainder higher than 0.50, the number of seats is rounded up to the next whole number.

4 – Adjustments

After the theoretical number of seats per province is obtained, adjustments are made in a process referred to as applying the “senatorial clause” and “grandfather clause.”

As we have seen, since 1915, the senatorial clause has guaranteed that no province has fewer members in the House of Commons than it has in the Senate. The *Representation Act, 1985* brought into effect a new grandfather clause that guaranteed each province no fewer seats than it had in 1976 or during the 33rd Parliament.

Appended to this text is a table demonstrating how the latest formula has been applied to the 2001 census figures (Appendix A) and to the 1991 census figures (Appendix B). At the beginning of this section is a table illustrating representation in the House of Commons from the date of Confederation to the 1996 Representation Order.

READJUSTING the Boundaries

So far we have examined how the number of seats in the House of Commons is determined and what method is used to divide that number among the ten provinces and three territories. After the numbers are established according to the constitutional formula, the second part of the exercise begins, namely, dividing each province into electoral districts, each of which is represented by a member elected to the House of Commons.

The whole exercise is most properly known as “readjustment of electoral district boundaries,” but is often referred to as “redistribution” and sometimes, particularly in other countries, as “redistricting.” While the *Constitution Act, 1867* specifies that a readjustment must take place after each 10-year census, the rules for actually carrying out this enormous task are laid down in the *Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act* (E.B.R.A.) of 1964. The main elements of the readjustment process will be outlined following this brief historical note.

HISTORICAL NOTE

Up to and including the boundary adjustment following the 1951 census, the House of Commons itself was responsible for fixing the boundaries of electoral districts, through a committee appointed especially for that purpose.

Several authorities on the subject have documented the history of the process up to the 1960s. In effect, there were no rules to guide the exercise. In the words of Professor Norman Ward (1967, p. 107), the process was a “freelance operation in which any rational boundary drawing was likely to be the result of coincidence or accident.” Professor Terence Qualter (1970, pp. 99–100) identified four informal “rules” which parliamentarians seemed to have followed in those days, namely: if the number of seats had to be reduced in a given area, 1) retain the incumbents’ districts; 2) eliminate the districts of members who were not going to run again; 3) reduce the seats of minority parties; and 4) if there was strong pressure to increase representation in heavily populated areas, increase the size of the House rather than reduce the representation in rural areas.

The research done on this period reveals a considerable amount of political influence on the readjustment process prior to the 1960s. This was often referred to as “gerrymandering,” a term used to describe the manipulation of riding boundaries so as to ensure, as far as possible, the re-election of the members of the governing party.

THE COMMISSIONS TAKE OVER

In the early 1960s, it was decided to assign the responsibility for readjusting electoral district boundaries to commissions independent of Parliament and parliamentarians, one for each province. Legislation to this effect was passed in November 1964. In the interest of political neutrality, each commission was to be chaired by a judge designated by the chief justice of the province and there were to be three other members. One of these was the Representation Commissioner, a public servant who was to sit on every commission. Initially, the other two members were to be political appointees, one each from the governing party and the official opposition party. However, objections from the other opposition parties led to amendments of the legislation, so that the Speaker of the House of Commons was made responsible for making the two remaining appointments to each commission.

The post of Representation Commissioner was abolished in 1979 and most of the duties were transferred to the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. Now each province has a three-member boundaries



A judge chairs each boundaries commission.

commission, chaired by a judge and comprising two other members appointed by the Speaker. As each of the three northern territories constitute an electoral district, they do not require electoral boundaries commissions.

The goal of a readjustment process that is genuinely free of partisan considerations is reinforced by a provision in the *Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act*, which specifies that no sitting member of the Senate or of a federal, provincial or territorial legislature can be appointed to a commission. In practice, many commission members, aside from the chairpersons, have been university professors or non-elected officials of legislative assemblies.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

The rules for readjusting the federal electoral boundaries were laid down in 1964. Members of the House of Commons realized that, for the process to be completely fair, it not only had to be free of political domination but also had to provide opportunities for everyone to express their views. Consequently, each commission publishes maps in the newspapers and invites the public to public hearings, which are held at several different locations chosen to encourage the participation of as many interested people as possible.

Members of the House of Commons are not by any means excluded from this process of public involvement. Indeed, it is recognized that they will invariably have strong views on both the names and boundaries of the proposed electoral districts. Therefore, members



Public hearings: a key step in the readjustment of electoral boundaries.

of the House of Commons are not only allowed to appear before a commission at the public hearings, but the legislation also provides the opportunity for them to object to the proposals of any of the boundaries commissions. This process occurs through a committee of the House of Commons established for the purposes of dealing with electoral matters. The commissions must consider objections, but are not obliged to make changes based on them.

In all cases, the final decisions as to where the boundary lines will be placed rest with each commission.



Boundary readjustment must take into consideration the community of interest, historical pattern and geographic characteristics of each electoral district.

CRITERIA – WHERE TO DRAW THE LINES?

After receiving maps and documentation on the relevant population data from the most recent decennial census from the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, commissions have one year to make proposals, hold public hearings and finalize their reports. Guidelines for this enormous task are found in the *Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act*, R.S. 1985, c. E-3, from which it is evident that the readjustment exercise is not simply a mathematical computation, but rather a delicate balancing act that must take into account human interests as well as geographic characteristics. In the course of their work, the commissions receive professional, financial, technical and administrative assistance from the Chief Electoral Officer and the staff of Elections Canada.

The commissions are charged with dividing the territory assigned to them into a specified number of electoral districts, so that the population of each one will correspond “as closely as is reasonably

possible” to the predetermined average (or “quotient”). In determining the electoral district boundaries, they must take into consideration “the community of interest or community of identity in or the historical pattern of an electoral district ... and a manageable geographic size for districts in sparsely populated, rural or northern regions”

To accommodate these human and geographic factors, the commissions are allowed to deviate from the average population figure when setting their boundaries. While restricted in most cases to a tolerance of 25 percent either way, a commission may exceed this limit “in circumstances viewed by the commission as being extraordinary.” Such circumstances are primarily prevalent in northern and sparsely populated electoral districts.

THE PROCESS OF READJUSTMENT

While the work of the commissions is indeed a crucial part of the readjustment exercise and may take up to one year or more to complete, in fact, it is only one part of the exercise. The whole process takes two years or more, from the time the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada receives the census data from the Chief Statistician of Canada to the time at which the new boundaries can be used at a general election.

The following chart identifies and explains the main stages in readjusting federal electoral boundaries. The relevant sections of the legislation are mentioned at each step.

PRELIMINARY STEPS

1.

ALLOCATION OF SEATS E.B.R.A.,* sections 13 and 14

After each 10-year census, the Chief Statistician of Canada provides the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada with population data for each province broken down by electoral districts and census enumeration areas.

Using these figures and the formula in sections 51 and 51A of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada calculates the number of seats to be allocated to each province and publishes the results in the *Canada Gazette*.

2.

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSIONS E.B.R.A., sections 3, 4, 5 and 6

The members of the boundaries commissions are selected and appointed by the Speaker of the House of Commons and the chief justice of each province.

Within 60 days from the time the Chief Statistician of Canada supplies the population data to the government and to the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, the 10 electoral boundaries commissions must be established and charged with determining the boundaries of new electoral districts.

The commissions are officially established by the Governor in Council (Cabinet).

DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSALS

3.

PUBLIC HEARINGS **E.B.R.A., section 19**

Each commission provides a redistribution plan. This is followed by the publication of newspaper advertisements that contain maps of the proposed electoral boundaries, as well as the time(s) and location(s) of public hearings, at least 60 days before the first hearing is scheduled.

A commission must hold at least one public hearing before completing its report.

Interested individuals, groups and members of the House of Commons and senators may appear at the hearings to express their views on the commission's proposals, after notifying the commission in writing of their intention to do so.

4.

COMPLETION OF REPORTS **E.B.R.A., section 20**

No later than one year after receiving the population data, each commission must complete its report on the new electoral districts.

The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada may grant an extension of up to six months when necessary.

REVIEW OF REPORTS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

5.

PARTICIPATION BY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

E.B.R.A., section 21 and subsections 22(1) and (2)

Each commission's report is sent through the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada to the Speaker of the House of Commons, who must ensure that it is tabled and referred to a committee of the House of Commons designated to deal with electoral matters.

Written objections, each signed by at least 10 members of the House of Commons, may be filed with the committee within 30 days of the tabling of a report.

The committee has 30 days, or a longer period if the House of Commons is not sitting, to discuss any objections to a report and return it to the Speaker of the House of Commons.

FINALIZING OF BOUNDARIES

6.

THE RESULTS OF REPORTS TO THE COMMISSIONS

E.B.R.A., subsection 22(3) and section 23

The reports are then returned to the commissions, accompanied by the minutes of the House of Commons committee. The commissions then decide whether to modify their reports.

FINALIZING OF BOUNDARIES (cont'd)

7.

REPRESENTATION ORDER

E.B.R.A., sections 24 to 27

The Chief Electoral Officer of Canada drafts a document called a “representation order” describing and naming the electoral districts established by the commissions and sends the document to the Governor in Council (Cabinet).

Within five days of receiving the draft representation order, the Governor in Council must publicly announce the new boundaries in a proclamation which must then be published in the *Canada Gazette* within another five days from that date.

The new boundaries cannot be used at an election until at least one year has passed between the date the representation order was proclaimed and the date that Parliament is dissolved for a general election.

**Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act*, R.S. 1985, c. E-3.

CONCLUSION

The preceding account shows how, since Confederation, the formula for calculating representation in the House of Commons and the process for adjusting electoral district boundaries have evolved.

The greatest changes have undoubtedly taken place in recent decades. Since the 1940s, we have seen three fundamental changes to the representation formula and one major change in the boundary readjustment process. The readjustments that followed the censuses of 1941, 1961, 1971 and 1981 were all delayed while such changes were made. Following the 1991 census, there were also delays caused by constitutional deliberations that resulted in the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord and a review of the *Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act* in general.

In comparison to some other democracies, Canada is still a relatively young country, with an electoral system that is, of necessity, subject to constant change. This being so, it will surely be worthy of continuing research and study as it adjusts in future years to meet the challenge of a growing and mobile population.

APPENDICES

A. REPRESENTATION FORMULA USING THE 2001 CENSUS FIGURES

Province or Territory	Minimum number of seats in accordance with the <i>Constitution Act, 1867</i> ¹	Calculations					Electoral quotient
		Population 2001	National quotient ²	Rounded result	Special clauses ³	Total	
Newfoundland and Labrador ⁴	7	512 930	107 220	5	2	7	73 276
Prince Edward Island	4	135 294	107 220	1	3	4	33 824
Nova Scotia	11	908 007	107 220	8	3	11	82 546
New Brunswick	10	729 498	107 220	7	3	10	72 950
Quebec	75	7 237 479	107 220	68	7	75	96 500
Ontario	95	11 410 046	107 220	106	0	106	107 642
Manitoba	14	1 119 583	107 220	10	4	14	79 970
Saskatchewan	14	978 933	107 220	9	5	14	69 924
Alberta	21	2 974 807	107 220	28	0	28	106 243
British Columbia	28	3 907 738	107 220	36	0	36	108 548
Nunavut	1	26 745	–	–	–	1	–
Northwest Territories	1	37 360	–	–	–	1	–
Yukon Territory	1	28 674	–	–	–	1	–
TOTAL	282	30 007 094				308	

¹ Assigns one seat each to Nunavut, the Northwest Territories and the Yukon Territory (three seats).

² Uses 279 seats and population of provinces to establish national quotient (29 914 315 ÷ 279 = 107 220).

³ Add seats to provinces pursuant to "senatorial clause" guarantee in the Constitution and "grandfather clause" (based on 33rd Parliament).

⁴ On December 6, 2001, the name of the province of Newfoundland was changed to Newfoundland and Labrador.

B. REPRESENTATION FORMULA USING THE 1991 CENSUS FIGURES

Province or Territory	Minimum number of seats in accordance with the <i>Constitution Act, 1867</i> ¹	Calculations					Electoral quotient
		Population 1991	National quotient ²	Rounded result	Special clauses ³	Total	
Newfoundland	7	568 474	97 532	6	1	7	81 211
Prince Edward Island	4	129 765	97 532	1	3	4	32 441
Nova Scotia	11	899 942	97 532	9	2	11	81 813
New Brunswick	10	723 900	97 532	7	3	10	72 390
Quebec	75	6 895 963	97 532	71	4	75	91 946
Ontario	95	10 084 885	97 532	103	0	103	97 912
Manitoba	14	1 091 942	97 532	11	3	14	77 996
Saskatchewan	14	988 928	97 532	10	4	14	70 638
Alberta	21	2 545 553	97 532	26	0	26	97 906
British Columbia	28	3 282 061	97 532	34	0	34	96 531
Northwest Territories ⁴	2	57 649	–	–	–	2	–
Yukon Territory	1	27 797	–	–	–	1	–
TOTAL	282	27 296 859				301	

¹ Assigns two seats to the Northwest Territories and one to the Yukon Territory (three seats).

² Uses 279 seats and population of provinces to establish national quotient (27 211 413 ÷ 279 = 97 532).

³ Add seats to provinces pursuant to "senatorial clause" guarantee in the Constitution and new "grandfather clause" (based on 33rd Parliament).

⁴ There is no quotient for the Northwest Territories; criteria other than population apply.

FURTHER Reading

The following list of references is not intended to be complete but is simply an introduction to the subjects covered in this publication:

Campbell v. A.G. Canada (1988) 49 D.L.R. (4) 321 (B.C.).

Canada. Parliament. House of Commons, *House of Commons Debates*, (1960-), Ottawa, Queen's Printer.

Canada. Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. 1991. *Reforming Electoral Democracy*, Volume 1, Ottawa, RCERPF RC.

Caron, Yves. 1967. "Un homme, un vote? : la réforme électorale fédérale (1966)," *Revue juridique Thémis* 2: 209-237.

Carty, R.K. 1985. "The Electoral Boundary Revolution in Canada," *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 15(3): 273-287.

Courtney, John C. 2001. "*Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada's Electoral Districts*," Montreal & Kingston: McGill – Queen's University Press.

Courtney, John C. 1988. "Parliament and Representation. The Unfinished Agenda of Election Redistributions," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, XXI: 4: 657-690.

Courtney, John C. 1985. "Theories Masquerading as Principles: Canadian Electoral Boundary Commissions and the Australian Model," in *The Canadian House of Commons: Essays in Honour of Norman Ward*, ed. John C. Courtney, Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

Courtney, John C., Peter MacKinnon and David E. Smith, eds. 1992. *Drawing Boundaries: Legislators, Courts, and Electoral Values*. Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers.

Dawson, R. MacGregor. 1935. "The Gerrymander of 1882," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 1: 197-221.

Dixon v. British Columbia (Attorney General), (1989), 35 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273 (C.S.).

Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, R.S. 1985, c. E-3.

Lyons, W.E. 1970. *One Man, One Vote*, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Co. of Canada.

Qualter, Terence H. 1967. "Representation by Population: A Comparative Study," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 33: 246-268.

Qualter, Terence H. 1970. *The Election Process in Canada*, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Co. of Canada, Chapter 3.

Reference re. Provincial Electoral Boundaries, [1993] 3 W.W.R. 593 (C.A. Sask.) printed by (*sub. nom. Reference re. Electoral Boundaries Commission Act*, ss. 14, 20 (Sask.)) (1991) 81 D.L.R. (4th) 16 (S.C.C.).

Sancton, Andrew. 1990. "Eroding Representation-by-Population in the Canadian House of Commons: the *Representation Act, 1985*," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, XXIII: 3: 441–457.

Small, David, ed. 1991. *Drawing the Map: Equality and Efficacy of the Vote in Canadian Electoral Boundary Reform*, Volume 11 of the research studies of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. Ottawa and Toronto: RCERPF/Dundurn.

Ward, Norman. 1953. "The Redistribution of 1952," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 19: 341–360. Reprinted in *Politics: Canada*, ed. Paul Fox, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Co. of Canada (1962), 250–264.

Ward, Norman. 1963. *The Canadian House of Commons: Representation*, 2nd edition, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Ward, Norman. 1967. "A Century of Constituencies," *Canadian Public Administration* 10(1): 105–221. Reprinted in *Contemporary Issues in Canadian Politics*, ed. Frederick Vaughan, Patrick Kyba and O.P. Divedi, Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall Canada Inc. (1970), 166–176.