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IntroductionDiscussion Paper 2: The Impact of Social Media Platforms in Elections

Social media platforms—websites and Internet applications that permit users to create, share, discover and interact with content, and that facilitate the development of social networks1—have become major sources of information and means of interaction for Canadians. Similarly, digital platforms that run data-driven advertising, including social media sites and search engines, have come to dominate the Canadian advertising landscape.

Social media and digital platforms have also become a central component of our electoral environment. They are considered valuable tools in reaching Canadians, efficiently and inexpensively, and are credited with spurring people to participate in elections in many ways, whether by updating their voter registration, donating to a political party or cause, or accessing information about political options and when, where and ways to vote.

In the wake of digital interference in elections around the world, however, governments, security agencies and others have begun to take a closer look at platforms and what they allow users to do.2 Like many countries, Canada has recognized that digital interference threats are now part of the election delivery landscape, and has taken measures to reinforce safeguards and to detect and mitigate potential digital electoral interference.3

This evolving digital environment raises questions about the need for greater regulation. These questions stretch beyond the mandate of Elections Canada, but they affect the electoral ecosystem in which the agency operates and could have a significant bearing on Canadians' trust in our democratic system.

Social media and digital platforms have grown with little transparency or external oversight, transcending borders and serving as the backbone of the digital economy.4 There is growing debate about whether and how to regulate the digital information sphere and the platforms that shape it.5 This debate has been fuelled by divergent views on how regulation should be implemented and rightful concerns about regulating political expression.6 The platforms themselves have acknowledged potential harms and have taken steps to mitigate them.7

This paper seeks to add to this debate by focusing on how platforms and their use impact the electoral process. It describes, at a high level, the unique characteristics of social media and data-driven digital ad platforms as they were at the time of the 2019 general election.8 It addresses the impact these platforms have on the electoral landscape in which Elections Canada operates—notably in the areas of access to reliable information, transparency and trust in the electoral process—and seeks input on how best to adapt to this evolving reality.

Footnotes

Footnote 1 Adapted from Jonathan A. Obar and Steven S. Wildman, "Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge: An Introduction to the Special Issue," Telecommunications Policy 39, no. 9 (2015): 745–50. Quello Center Working Paper 2663153.

Footnote 2 The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) has described the threats that Canada's own electoral process faces. In reports published in 2017 and 2019, the CSE reported that cyber interference in democracies with advanced economies has more than tripled since 2015, and that around the world, domestic and non-state actors have been adopting techniques including the use of disinformation and artificial amplification. These techniques are used to realize goals that include depressing turnout, changing election outcomes, and sowing distrust and discord. Communications Security Establishment, "Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic Process" (2017). https://cyber.gc.ca/sites/default/files/publications/cse-cyber-threat-assessment-e.pdf; Communications Security Establishment, "2019 Update: Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic Process" (2019). https://cyber.gc.ca/sites/default/files/publications/tdp-2019-report_e.pdf

Footnote 3 Elections Canada, "Election Security," February 7, 2020. https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=bkg/sec&document=index&lang=e/; Democratic Institutions, "Government of Canada unveils plan to safeguard Canada's 2019 election," Government of Canada, January 30, 2019. https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/news/2019/01/government-of-canada-unveils-plan-to-safeguard-canadas-election.html/. See, further, Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, "Report on the 43rd General Election of October 21, 2019," 57–60. https://www.elections.ca/res/rep/off/sta_ge43/stat_ge43_e.pdf. During the election campaign itself, the federal government did observe attempted information influence operations, though none met the threshold for public communication as laid out by the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (Elizabeth Thompson, "'More needs to be done,' Gould says after some online election meddling detected," CBC News, October 28, 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/election-misinformation-disinformation-interference-1.5336662/).

Footnote 4 Taylor Owen, "Introduction: Why Platform Governance?" in Models for Platform Governance: A CIGI Essay Series (2019), 3–6. https://www.cigionline.org/articles/introduction-why-platform-governance/

Footnote 5 At the federal level in Canada, this debate has featured in parliamentary committees such as the Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics Committee (ETHI), the Procedure and House Affairs Committee (PROC) and others, as well as policy development by the (former) ministry of Democratic Institutions and by Canadian Heritage, and studies and investigations by federal and provincial privacy commissioners. In the US, studies conducted by the Senate Intelligence Committee and other committees, as well as FBI investigations culminating in the Mueller Report and many other investigations, reports and studies, have focused on these questions. The UK Parliament's Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee has issued a white paper on regulating online harms; the UK Information Commissioner and Elections Commissioner have both published reports and investigations on the topic, as have many civil society and marketing organizations in the UK. There has also been a joint international effort in this area: the International Grand Committee on Big Data, Privacy and Democracy, which had participation from the Parliaments of 17 countries, including Canada. A recent poll found that sixty percent of Canadians feel the government should intervene to "require that social media companies fix the problems they created in our political system" (Abacus Data (August 2019), cited in Tony Wang, "Majority of Canadians want government to regulate social media, poll says," The Toronto Star, September 25, 2019. https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2019/09/25/majority-of-canadians-want-government-to-regulate-social-media-poll-says.html.

Footnote 6 For example, Facebook has expressed the need "for new regulatory frameworks for online content – frameworks that ensure companies are making decisions about online speech in a way that minimizes harm but also respects the fundamental right to free expression" (Monika Bickert, "Charting a Way Forward: Online Content Regulation," Facebook, February 2020, 4. https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Charting-A-Way-Forward_Online-Content-Regulation-White-Paper-1.pdf).

Footnote 7 Kristie Phillips and Brian Fung, "Facebook Admits Social Media Sometimes Harms Democracy," The Washington Post, January 22, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/01/22/facebook-admits-it-sometimes-harms-democracy/; Adam Mosseri, "Working to Stop Misinformation and False News," Facebook, April 7, 2017. https://www.facebook.com/facebookmedia/blog/working-to-stop-misinformation-and-false-news

Footnote 8 In this paper, we examine the operation of platforms that were widely used at the time of the 43rd general election, from the pre-election period that started on June 30, 2019, until election day, October 21, 2019. During this general election, EC's Social Media Monitoring Unit "provided timely insights and actionable information to support effective election delivery and communications, and to safeguard Canadians' trust in the electoral process." The team, fluent in 21 languages, "monitored keywords appearing in public posts on several social media networks, to detect: events that could impede electors or election delivery, feedback on Elections Canada's services, websites and social media accounts that falsely claimed to belong to Elections Canada, inaccurate information about the electoral process, whether intentional or unintentional." See further, Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, "Report on the 43rd General Election of October 21, 2019," 57–60. https://www.elections.ca/res/rep/off/sta_ge43/stat_ge43_e.pdf