Elections Canada's social media monitoring function – CEO appearance on Foreign Interference in Canadian Elections before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

Key Messages

• As part of its mandate to provide accurate information about the federal electoral process and an extension of its traditional media monitoring, Elections Canada (EC) monitors publicly available social media and digital content for information about the federal electoral process to be aware of when inaccurate or misleading information is being shared.
• EC does not enquire into the source of the information observed online.

Facts

• Prior to the 44^th general election (GE44), EC updated its framework to address inaccurate and misleading information about the electoral process as a tool to deliver on our mandate.

• EC used its understanding of the information environment to develop and update its communications products (including Web site and social media accounts) to share accurate information to pre-emptively address inaccurate information on certain aspects of the federal electoral process.

• EC also used its monitoring function to react quickly to inaccurate narratives in the environment, using its various communications channels (for example, to counter the narrative that a vaccine passport would be required to vote).

• Monitoring plays a key role in detecting, assessing and informing the agency on operational issues or where inaccurate or misleading information that may be circulating about the electoral process.

• EC monitors publicly available content for:
  • Inaccurate/misleading information about when, where, how to register or vote
  • Inaccurate/misleading information about EC's mandate or operations
  • Reports of incidents or threats that could impact EC's operations
  • Impersonation of EC
  • Posts expressing Canadian electors' sentiment towards the administration of the election: confusion, concerns about voting experiences
• EC uses digital platforms monitoring tools and keyword searches to capture relevant content, then collating that content for later reporting.
• During GE44, EC monitored:
  • Mainstream Platforms: Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, YouTube, TikTok, news websites, LinkedIn
  • Niche/Alternative Platforms: 4Chan, Gab, Bitchute, and more (changes occur frequently, use specific language and culture);
  • Additional language platforms: WeChat, Douyin, VK, Naver
• During GE44, EC monitored the digital environment in 15 languages: English, French, Mandarin, Russian, Spanish, Cantonese, Portuguese, Arabic, Hindi, Punjabi, Korean, Somali, Japanese, Kirundi, and Kinyarwanda.
• During GE44, EC observed 4,313 relevant posts, compared to 1,642 during GE43.
• The topics/narratives most frequently observed were:
  • Inaccurate/misleading information about when, where, how to register or vote
  • Inaccurate/misleading information about EC's mandate or operations
  • Reports of incidents or threats that could impact EC's operations
    

    Reports of incidents or threats that could impact EC's operations

    Topic	Number of posts in GE44
    'Mail-in' ballots	1,774
    GE44 will be rigged	1,389
    Machine voting/tabulating	781
    EC is corrupt	709
    Issues with accessibility to vote	663
    Holding an election during a pandemic was a bad idea	604
    Ways to vote	522
    Issues with lineups	489
    Neutral conversation about GE44	473
    EC's mandate	370